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CITADEL CADETS DODGE THE STATE ACTION
BULLET: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MENTA VLOS V.
ANDERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
To say that The Citadel has had its share of gender integration problems would
be like calling Tiger Woods a decent golfer. First, Shannon Faulkner was denied
enrollment in 1993 after being admitted to the school because officials discovered
that she was female.' After Faulkner instituted legal action, the school begrudgingly
allowed her to enroll in the fall of 1995.2 Second, the United States Supreme Court
struck down another admissions policy at Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in June
1996.' Only after this court ruling did The Citadel abandon its male-only
admissions policy, thus allowing women to enroll in the Corps of Cadets for the
first time.4 Four women subsequently enrolled at The Citadel in the fall of 1996.s
However, according to two of those women, The Citadel's fight against gender
integration has simply become covert rather than overt. By December 1996, Jeanie
Mentavlos and Kim Messer had withdrawn from the school, citing recurring sexual
harassment and other abuses.6 Mentavlos thereafter filed a lawsuit in federal court,7
alleging that upper-class cadets had harassed her because she was a woman.'
Specifically, Mentavlos claimed that the cadets' actions abridged her Fourteenth
Amendment right to equalprotection in violation of42 U.S.C. § 1983 and deprived
her of equal access to education in violation of Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.9
Section 1983 subjects an individual to personal liability who, while acting
"under color of [state law]," violates another person's constitutional rights.'" This
1. Elizabeth Gleick, Let the Hell Week Begin, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 39.
2. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL FEES FROM THE BATTLE To ADMIT SHANNON
FAULKNER WILL GO TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT (Oct. 4, 2000), at
http://www.aclu.orglnews/2O00/n100400a.html.
3. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556-58 (1996) (holding that the adoption of
substantially similar program at a women's college did not remedy VMI's unconstitutional male-only
admissions policy); see also Chris Burritt, The Citadel Faces Open-Ended 'Hell Week' in Court,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 10, 1999, at A14 (discussing the VMI case).
4. United States v. Jones, 136 F.3d 342, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1998).
5. Burritt, supra note 3, at A14.
6. Bill Hewitt & Don Sider, Conduct Unbecoming, PEOPLE, Jan. 27, 1997, at 40, 42.
7. Burritt, supra note 3, at A14. Kim Messer also filed a similar suit against The Citadel. Id. The
suit settled for a reported $37,750. Id.
8. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 610, 612-14 (D.S.C. 2000).
9. Id. at 610-11; see also Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing
Mentavlos' claims).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001). Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation, . . . of
any State. .. , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
1
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Note discusses the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mentavlos v. Anderson," in which
the court considered whether students at publicly-funded schools could be "state
actors" for purposes of § 1983.12 This Note concludes that the Fourth Circuit
correctly held that students are not state actors based on traditional state-action tests
and on public-policy notions. However, this Note argues that upholding summary
judgment for the cadets was incorrect in light of the "action in concert" and
conspiracy state-action tests, and that the decision violated general principles of
fairness. Part II contains the factual and procedural background of the Mentavlos
case. Part III offers a critique of the Fourth Circuit's holding and reasoning in
Mentavlos. Part III also analyzes the Mentavlos facts in light of other state-action
tests not considered by the parties, the district court, or the Fourth Circuit. Part IV
concludes by offering suggestions for future similar state-action cases brought to
the Fourth Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The State of South Carolina established The Citadel in Charleston on December
20, 1842.3 The school incorporates military discipline and training into its
educational curriculum.' 4 To implement its strict military-style education, The
Citadel established what is known as the "Fourth Class System."' 5 This system
allows upperclassmen to ensure that freshmen cadets, also known as "knobs," learn
the procedures and traditions of The Citadel by requiring "strict and unquestioning
obedience, mental andphysical toughness, and mature tolerance of confrontation."' 6
Knobs are expected to respect upperclassmen and to comply with their orders
without question or hesitation. 7 Therefore, the Fourth Class System's treatment of
knobs reinforces The Citadel's overall military-style education."
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law....
Id.
11. 249 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2001).
12. Id. at 305.
13. THE CITADEL, ORIGINS, at http://www.citadel.edu/history/origins.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2002) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. The Citadel is also known as the South Carolina Military Academy. Id.
14. See id.
15. See THE CITADEL, THE FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM MANUAL OF THE CORPS OF CADETS 5 (2000)
[hereinafter THE FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM MANUAL].
16. Id.
17. See id. at 7-8.
18. See id. at 5.
[Vol. 53: 737
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Although The Citadel historically performed distinctly military functions,' 9 its
primary purpose is now "to educate undergraduates as members of the South
Carolina Corps of Cadets and to prepare [undergraduates] for post-graduate
positions of leadership through academic programs of recognized excellence
supported by the best features of a structured military environment." 20
For more than a century, The Citadel provided this unique educational
experience to males only. Compelled by a court order, The Citadel admitted a
female cadet in August 1995.21 Jeanie Mentavlos and three other females enrolled
as cadets the following year.'
Shortly after her arrival at The Citadel, Mentavlos received her first exposure
to the Fourth Class System. According to her account, the treatment she
experienced from at least five cadets constituted "'sexual harassment, intimidation,
and abuse.""3 Mentalvos claimed that this treatment was the result of a conspiracy
"to perpetuate the former all-male Corps of Cadets by driving her from the school.24
Two of the cadets, John Justice Anderson and James Saleeby, were defendants in
the case.'
As to Cadet Anderson, the district court found sufficient evidence to support
allegations that he: (1) left welts on Mentavlos' chin by pushing cardboard in her
face because she smiled while standing at attention, (2) possibly subjected
Mentavlos to unequal treatment when she was found drinking alcohol, and (3)
threatened her with physical harm or death on numerous occasions.26
Regarding Cadet Saleeby, the court concluded that evidence supported
allegations that he: (1) kicked Mentavlos without leaving bruises, (2) entered her
room wearing only gym shorts and sandals, and (3) ordered another cadet to light
Mentavlos' clothing on fire while she was wearing it and then put out the fire with
his foot.27
Mentavlos alleged that due to these and other incidents, she decided to
withdraw from The Citadel in December 1996.25
19. See ORIGINs, supra note 13. The buildings that came to be called The Citadel originally
served as guard houses that provided military and police protection for Charleston in the late 1820s
and 1830s. Id. Guard duty was later combined with education in 1842, and the current version of The
Citadel began to take shape. Id.
20. THE CITADEL, MISSION STATEMENT, at http://www.citadel.edu/library/KnobScan/
citadel_missionl.pdf(last visited Mar. 16,2002) [hereinafterMISSONSTATEMENT].Butsee Mentavlos
v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that The Citadel's mission statement during
Mentavlos' attendance read '"to educate male undergraduates') (citation omitted).
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. Burritt, supra note 3, at A14.
23. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306 (citation omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (D.S.C. 2000).
27. Id. at 612-13. The fire incident did not bum Mentavlos. Id. at 612.
28. Id. at 611. In addition to the incidents described by the court, allegations of other instances
of hazing have surfaced. For example, Mentavlos was allegedly denied food until she could correctly
answer a question "about the Knights ofthe Golden Circle, an extreme faction of the [Ku Klux Klan]."
Female Cadet at The Citadel Allegedly Hazedfor Lack of Klan Knowledge, JET, June 30, 1997, at 26.
2002]
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B. Procedural Background
In 1997, Jeanie Mentavlos filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina, claiming that her constitutional right to equal
protection was abridged in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985; she
also argued that her right to receive an education was abridged in violation of Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972.29 She named as defendants The Citadel
and its governing Board of Visitors, Captain Richard Ellis, and five upper-class
cadets of "Echo Company,"3 the unit of cadets to which she had been assigned.3 1
Before the trial commenced, all defendants except one moved for summary
judgment.32 Eventually, The Citadel, Captain Ellis, and three of the cadets settled
with Mentavlos. 33 Mentavlos subsequently amended her complaint to assert a
§ 1983 claim against only Anderson and Saleeby, and she chose to proceed to trial
solely on the § 1983 claim.34 Anderson and Saleeby thereafter moved for summary
judgment, arguing that they were not state actors because they "did not act 'under
color of state law for purposes of § 1983. '3
Judge Joseph Anderson agreed that the defendants were not state actors and
granted both of their summary judgment motions.36 The district court subsequently
certified the case for immediate appeal.37 Mentavlos acted upon this certification
and appealed Judge Anderson's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
3
On appeal, Mentavlos asserted that the district court erroneously granted
summary judgment to cadets Anderson and Saleeby.39 Specifically, she contended
that the district court erred in holding that neither cadet was a state actor for
purposes of § 1983 because the cadets performed "powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State,"4 and their actions were "fairly attributable to the State."'4 1 In
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit held
29. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306.
30. Id. at 306. Captain Ellis was the commanding administrative officer of Echo Company. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. One cadet was in default. Id.
33. See id.; see also Citadel Ex-Cadet's Suit Dismissed, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2000, at A8
(noting that The Citadel settled with Mentavlos for $100,000, that the settlement terms included no
admission of fault by The Citadel or its administrators, and that this settlement also covered Captain
Ellis).
34. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306.
35. Id.
36. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 628 (D.S.C. 2000). Regarding Saleeby, the
district court alternatively granted his motion for summary judgment because Mentavlos failed to
prove that his actions were "motivated by gender bias." Id.
37. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 307.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 312.
40. Id. at 314 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 318.
[Vol. 53: 737
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that the cadets were not state actors because they neither exercised exclusively state
functions nor acted in a manner that was fairly attributable to the State.42
I. ANALYSIS
A. None of the Traditional State-Action Tests Argued byMentavlos Supports
a Finding That the Cadets Are State Actors for Section 1983 Purposes
To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
"deprived him of a right secured by the 'Constitution and laws' of the United
States," and he must show that the defendant "deprived him of this constitutional
right 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory.' 43 Thus, to succeed onher § 1983 claim against cadets Anderson
and Saleeby, Mentavlos had to prove that they deprived her of a constitutional right
while acting under color of state law. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit
dodged the issue of whether the cadets deprived Mentavlos of a constitutionally
guaranteed right," though the trial court granted summary judgment for Saleeby on
the alternative ground that Mentavlos had failed to prove that her actions were
discriminatory.4 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit addressed only the issue of
whether Mentavlos had proved that the cadets' actions were, in essence, actions of
the state. 6 Mentavlos advanced two unpersuasive arguments in an attempt to
illustrate how the cadets were state actors.
Mentavlos first argued that she should avoid summary judgment based on the
"traditional government function" state-action test, claiming that The Citadel's use
of unique techniques to train civilians for military service represented a traditional
state function.47 Her argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, and most
obviously, The Citadel does not train civilians for military service;48 rather, the
school seeks to train responsible and outstanding civic leaders.49 The court properly
noted that educating and preparing students for community leadership have never
been exclusive functions of the State."0 Additionally, the school is not a service
academy which merely trains civilians for the military; rather it incorporates a
military model into its educational curriculum." Mentavlos failed to demonstrate
how The Citadel's offering of an educational curriculum based on a military model
42. Id. at 322-23. The Supreme Court recently denied Mentavlos' petition for certiorari.
Mentavlos v. Anderson, 122 S. Ct. 349 (2001) (mem.).
43. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
44. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 323 n.8.
45. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 628 (D.S.C. 2000).
46. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 305.
47. Id. at 312, 314.
48. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314.
49. MIssioN STATEMENT, supra note 20.
50. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314.
51. Id. at 316. The court notes that in this respect, "there is 'no significant distinction between
what The Citadel does and what many private secondary schools do."' Id. (quoting Mentavlos v.
Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623 (D.S.C. 2000)).
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proved that its cadets performed functions traditionally reserved to the state. Even
if Mentavlos had proved that The Citadel was a state actor due to its unique
educational style, she still would have had to show that the state or the institution
cloaked the cadets "with sovereign powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the
government."52
Mentavlos' claim was further weakened by her argument that Citadel cadets are
given government authority because they are in the military just like cadets at
federal military-service academies. 3 Simply put, Cadets Anderson and Saleeby
were not government military personnel performing traditional government
functions when they enforced military-style discipline at The Citadel. Both the
district court and the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the absence of the cadets'
ties with the United States Armed Forces as a crucial factor in determining whether
the State delegated to the cadets traditional government powers.-4 Mentavlos argued
that because The Citadel required its cadets to participate in a Senior Reserve
Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, they were granted military powers by
the State.55 However, the Fourth Circuit found that cadets participated in ROTC just
like other state-supported college students, which partly defeated Mentavlos' claim
that the state cloaked the cadets with some special authority.56 Furthermore, cadets
are not enlisted members of any military service branch, and they incur no military-
service commitment by virtue of their attendance at The Citadel.5 7 In finding that
Citadel cadets were not similar to service-academy cadets, the Fourth Circuit
attached particular significance to the fact that none of the cadets involved in the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 315-16. Cadets at the federal military-service academies incur a service commitment
by enrolling and attending the academies. Id. at 315. For example, at the United States Military
Academy (West Point), cadets who enroll automatically agree to serve for five years of active duty
and for three years of reserve duty as "repayment" for the cost-free education they receive at the
academy. See FAQS: ABOUT WEST POINT, at http://www.usma.edu/admissions/ faqs._wp.asp (last
visited Mar. 16, 2002).
54. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314-18; see also Mentavlos, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 622-23.
55. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 315. As part of its curriculum, The Citadel requires all cadets to
participate in Senior ROTC programs, meaning that the cadets receive military education and training
to prepare them for a possible commission in the armed forces upon graduation. See UNITED STATES
ARMY: CADET COMMAND HEADQUARTERS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mill/faqs/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). However, only cadets who are
on scholarship under these programs and who have an intent to enter active military duty upon
graduation are under a "commitment contract." Id. Mere attendance at The Citadel or participation in
a Senior ROTC program, without more, does not mean that a cadet has a military service commitment
or is considered to be in the military. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 315.
56. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 315. The military-style discipline which upper-class cadets exercise
over fourth-class cadets on a constant basis is not a product of the ROTC program. The disciplinary
system is part of the greater overall military-style educational experience offered by The Citadel, of
which the ROTC programs are an integral part. See id. In other words, upper-class cadets exercise
their unique discipline over fourth-class cadets even when the cadets are not performing in their
ROTC programs. Therefore, the mere existence of ROTC programs at The Citadel does not grant
cadets any special authority because most institutions of higher education also offer these programs.
See id.
57. Id.
[Vol. 53: 737
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case held ROTC commitment contracts; furthermore, the court noted that "only
about one-third of the Corps of Cadets enter[ed] military service upon
graduation."58 Accordingly, the court correctly concluded that the cadets were not
military personnel. 9 Consequently, they could not be held as state actors for § 1983
purposes based on the argument that they were cloaked with traditional government
powers by virtue of their being in the military.6 0 Thus, Mentavlos' reliance upon the
traditional government function state-action test was faulty, and this argument
utterly failed to convince the district court and the Fourth Circuit that summary
judgment was improper.
Mentavlos next argued the "fairly attributable" state-action test, claiming that
because the State provides funding to The Citadel and regulates its administration,
the cadets' actions thereunder should be treated as under color of state law.62 This
argument also falls short of the mark. Mentavlos argued in the district court that
both the State and The Citadel empowered the cadets to perform traditionally state
functions by promulgating the rules and regulations that established the disciplinary
system under which these cadets improperly harassed and discriminated against
Mentavlos.63 However, cadets' authority over freshmen is generally of limited
scope." The regulations underlying the Fourth Class disciplinary system prohibit
gender-based harassment and discourage abuse of the special position occupied by
upperclassmen over freshmenY.6 Under The Citadel's own regulations, an upper-
58. Id. Mentavlos also relied on the doctrine ofFeres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,146 (1950),
which states that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not provide a cause of action against the United
States for military personnel who sustained injuries due to military service. Id. at 314. The Feres
doctrine has been applied to cadets at the federal military-service academies, and therefore Mentavlos
argued that Citadel cadets were similarly "in the military." Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314; see also
Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217,220-21 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that AirForce Academy cadets
were "in the military" for purposes of the Feres doctrine). Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed in
the text above, the Fourth Circuit concluded thatFeres had no application to this case, and that Citadel
cadets were not "in the military." Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 315-16. In fact, during the academic year
1996-97, the term forwhich Mentavlos was admitted, 1821 cadets were at The Citadel, and only 264
of them were on an ROTC scholarship and under a commitment contract; furthermore, only thirty-two
percent of the graduating seniors received commissions in the United States military. THE CITADEL,
CORPS OFCADETS, athttp://wwv.citadel.edu/planningandassessment/factbook/corps (lastvisited Mar.
16,2002).
59. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 315-16.
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id.; see also Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 624 (D.S.C. 2000).
62. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 318.
63. Mentavlos, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 623; see also Leon Friedman, Anatomy ofa StateAction Case:
Mentavlos v. Anderson, in 641 PRACrTSING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 355, 379-81 (2000) (discussing the alleged nexus between the
state and the Citadel cadets).
64. See THE FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM MANUAL, supra note 15, at 7-8; see also Mentavlos, 249
F.3d at 308 (stating that the fourth class system expressly prohibits impermissible discrimination,
provides for complaint procedures, and strictly prohibits hazing or abusive treatment).
65. THE FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM MANUAL, supra note 15, at 6-8.
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class cadet can not touch freshmen without permission, and even then touching is
allowed only in limited circumstances.66
Based on the foregoing analysis, Mentavlos' focus on the school's disciplinary
regulations to prove Cadets Anderson and Saleeby acted under color of state law
seems flawed. If The Citadel's rules prohibit the exact type of treatment that
Mentavlos allegedly received from Cadets Anderson and Saleeby, then her
argument that the cadets' actions, under these same rules, were fairly attributable
either to the state or to The Citadel must fail. 67 The court agreed that cadets'
authority under the Fourth Class System did not grant them powers traditionally
reserved to the state.68 Furthermore, The Citadel administration disciplined many
of the cadets involved in the alleged harassment,69 which further convinced the
court that neither The Citadel nor its regulations extended to the cadets authority to
engage in harassment, abuse, or discrimination. 70 Based on the foregoing
considerations, the court correctly held that "the challenged actions of Anderson
and Saleeby could not be fairly characterized as taken in furtherance of the limited
authority granted to upper-class cadets to instruct and correct fourth class cadets.'
A particularly weak point in Mentavlos' argument is that she focused on the
wrong "person" as acting under color of state law. To bolster her § 1983 claim,
Mentavlos should have focused on how Cadets Anderson and Saleeby themselves
acted under color of state law.72 Evidence that The Citadel receives funding from
and is regulated in various respects by the State does not show how the individual
cadets' actions were to be taken as actions of the State.73 Cadets Anderson and
Saleeby were merely private students who benefitted from a government-regulated
and publicly-assisted institution of higher education.74 In the absence of evidence
that the State provided special assistance to the Citadel cadets, the Fourth Circuit
believed that mere government funding and regulation of The Citadel was
insufficient to make the cadets' actions fairly attributable to the state.75
As pleaded and argued, Mentavlos' § 1983 claim was doomed to fail against
the cadets' summary judgment motions. She had the burden of proving that in some
manner Cadets Anderson and Saleeby, as private students at a non-federal military
service academy, were transformed from students to state actors when they
allegedly harassed her, discriminated against her, and denied her an equal right to
education because of her gender. The strategy of using traditional state-action tests
66. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 308 (citations omitted). Touching can occur only in open view of
another cadet and only for instructional or correctional purposes. Id.
67. See Mentavlos, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
68. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 320-21.
69. See Hewitt & Sider, supra note 6, at 43 (indicating that eleven cadets were brought up on
disciplinary charges, and at least one was suspended, due to the alleged harassment).
70. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 320-21.
71. Id. at 321.
72. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
73. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 318-19.
74. Id. at 319.
75. Id.
[Vol. 53: 737
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to prove that private students could become state actors clearly failed to persuade
either the district court or the Fourth Circuit. Mentavlos needed to look beyond the
face of § 1983 to find an argument that could overcome the cadets' summary
judgment motions. Such an argument exists in a variation of the state-action tests
under § 1983 which will be discussed below. 76
B. Public Policy Supports Finding That Cadets as Individually and Privately
Acting Students Are Not Themselves State Actors for Purposes of Section
1983
Courts have consistently held that § 1983 does not reach purely private
conduct; the statute reaches private discriminatory conduct only when it is
facilitated and authorized by the actor's state-derived power.77 This limited scope
is evidenced by § 1983's required element of state action.78 The United States
Supreme Court has reasoned that § 1983's scope is so limited because "[w]ithout
a limit such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they
seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community
surrounding them."79 If the Fourth Circuit were to have held that private cadets'
conduct constituted state action under the traditional state-action tests, the Supreme
Court's fears would have been realized. Section 1983's scope limitations would
have become illusory.
Mentavlos' two principal arguments attempted to circumvent § 1983's
establishedpurpose and policy. First, Mentavlos failed to produce evidence that The
Citadel's military-style education transformed it into a service academy which
trained civilians for the military and performed traditional state functions.8" Second,
she failed to demonstrate how private cadets who attended non-service academies,
who incurred no service commitment, and who were not bound under a ROTC
contract performed traditional state functions.8 ' Mentavlos essentially asked the
Fourth Circuit to find that private students were state actors merely because they
attended an institution that incorporated military-style discipline into its curriculum.
Such a position is contrary to § 1983 case law and is unsound from a policy
standpoint.
82
A recent Ninth Circuit case, Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center,
83
has rejected a similar argument as to why private employers should be considered
76. See infra Part llI.C.
77. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,58 (1999) (refusing to attribute
a private insurer's decisions to the state); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826,
835 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting thatprivate discriminatory acts are notreached by § 1983 even when they
are particularly egregious).
78. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
79. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
80. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
83. 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999).
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state actors for purposes of § 1983. In Sutton, the plaintiff filed various actions
against a private employer after the employer refused to hire him.8 4 The plaintiff
was not hired because he refused to provide the employer with a social security
number as mandated by law due to his religious beliefs.8 5 The Sutton plaintiff
argued that the statute constituted governmental compulsion, and thus, the
employer's refusal to hire him was an action performed under color of state law.86
The Sutton court declined to find that private employers were state actors when they
merely complied with an applicable law, noting that the plaintiff's argument would
result in the unsound policy of"convert[ing] every employer-whether it ha[d] one
employee or 1,000 employees-into a governmental actor every time it complie[d]
with a presumptively valid, generally applicable law .... Private employers would
then be forced to defend those laws and [to] pay any consequent damages.""
The Sutton plaintiffs argument is very similar to Mentavlos' first argument.
Mentavlos contended that by mere attendance at a military-type school, students are
transformed into military personnel and thus serve traditional government
functions.88 If the Fourth Circuit agreed with Mentavlos, then every private person
who entered an educational institution that based its curriculum on military-style
discipline would, by his attendance alone, be in the military and consequently
would be a state actor for § 1983 purposes.
The danger in upholding Mentavlos' traditional state-action arguments is
evident. Holding that Citadel cadets are state actors merely due to their attendance
at a military-style educational institution would unnecessarily expand § 1983's
limited scope, would create a new class of state actors, and would drastically
increase private students' potential liability. High schools, junior colleges, and
many public and private universities throughout the country base their curricula in
whole or in part on the military model, even though they are not service
academies.9" In effect, Mentavlos' argument would significantly expand the scope
84. Id. at 830-44. TheSutton plaintiff asserted a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), which includes an "under color of state law" provision similar to § 1983's. Id. at 834;
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(l). Indeed, the court analyzed the "under-color-of-state-law" provision of
RFRA in light of§ 1983 decisions concerning that provision. Sutton, 192 F.3d at 834-36. The court
noted that "'[w]hen a legislature borrows an already judicially interpreted phrase from an old statute
to use it in a new statute, it is presumed that the legislature intends to adopt not merely the old phrase,
but the judicial construction of that phrase.'" Id. at 834-35 (quoting Long v. Dir., Office of Workers'
Comp. Programs, 767 F.2d 1578, 1581 (9th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, the court indicated that "'the
required degree of [government] action under RFRA is analyzed under the same standard as § 1983."'
Id. at 835 (quoting Brownson v. Bogenschutz, 966 F. Supp. 795, 797 (E.D. Wis. 1997)) (alteration in
original).
85. Sutton, 192 F.3d at 829-30. The plaintiff contended that social security numbers were the
"Mark of the Beast" and that "his religion prevented him from providing such a number." Id.
86. Id. at 837.
87. Id. at 838.
88. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
89. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623 (D.S.C. 2000).
90. Some high schools, like the Fork Union Military Academy (Fork Union, VA) and the Marine
Military Academy (Harlingen, TX), base their educational curriculum on a military model, even
though the schools are not federal service academies. See FORK UNION MILITARY ACADEMY, ABOUT
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of § 1983 to cover the private action of all students who attended an institution with
even a hint of "military flavor," when by its very language that scope is limited to
state action.9' Students' personal actions, even if taken under a particular type of
model or system, do not, without more, rise to the level of action under color of
state law because there is no extension or element of action by the state. Such
private actions fail to satisfy the traditional state-action tests, and the Fourth Circuit
correctly declined to extend § 1983's coverage to private students simply because
they attended a school which implemented a military-style education.92
Mentavlos' second argument-that the cadets' actions under the state-regulated
disciplinary curriculum were fairly attributable to the state and thereby made them
state actors93 -is also contrary to § 1983's policy. Although state regulation and
funding of The Citadel demonstrates more state involvement than was shown in
Mentavlos' first argument, her second argument is nevertheless fatally flawed.
Mentavlos produced no evidence showing that the defendants or any of the cadets
themselves received special state funding or were subject personally and
individually to state regulation.94 Therefore, her argument failed to demonstrate any
state involvement in the cadets' personal decisions and actions.95 Certainly, the
State regulates some general aspects of The Citadel through funding and by virtue
of having various of the institution's employees on its payroll, but this evidence
goes to prove that The Citadel itself, rather than the cadets, is a state actor.96 To
agree with Mentavlos is to transform private action into state action merely because
students, by virtue of attending an institution whose systems and regulations are
promulgated by the State and by the institution itself, act pursuant to those systems
and regulations. The State does not direct, regulate, or mandate individual students'
actions; rather, it solely controls the institutional infrastructure.97 If anyone is to be
liable as a state actor for constitutional injuries resulting from these policies and
procedures, the liable party should be the institution that implemented and
administered the system, rather than the students whose private actions merely
FUMA, at http:llvw.forkunion.comlinfo/aboutlindex.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002); MARINE
MILITARY ACADEMY, CHARACTERISTICS OF INSTITUTION, at http://wVv.ies-ed.com/descriptions/
marine military/l.html (last visited Mar. 4,2002). Some colleges, like the Virginia Military Institute
(Lexington, VA), employ military models for their entire educational style and institutional
infrastructure. VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, at http://www.vnii.edu
(last visited Mar. 16, 2002). Other colleges, such as Texas A&M University (College Station, TX),
provide a non-military-based curriculum while simultaneously offering students who desire a military-
style education a separate learning experience. TEXAS A&M, FACTS AND STATS, at
http://%A,;,.tamu.edu/univresheets/d00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
91. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001).
92. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 314-16 (4th Cir. 2001).
93. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
94. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 319.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The State of South Carolina originally established The Citadel to train cadets in the context
ofa military-style educational curriculum. See ORIGINSsupra note 13. This institutional infrastructure
has continued to the present. See MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 20.
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conformed to the system. Thus, Mentavlos' argument failed to prove the requisite
connection between the cadets' private actions and the State's involvement."
Mentavlos' position also presents the threat of a "slippery slope" and
unnecessarily expands the scope of § 1983's coverage. For the Fourth Circuit to
hold that private students' actions are fairly attributable to the state because the
students acted pursuant to institutional systems regulated and funded by the state
would subject many students acting in various capacities to § 1983 liability.99 For
example, a high school or college football player acts under and in accordance with
rules and regulations enacted by athletic associations, and courts have held that the
associations are themselves state actors.' Following Mentavlos' theory to its
logical conclusion, these players would become state actors for § 1983 purposes
when they participated in games and practices; thus, any perceived constitutional
injury that occurred during those events would subject those students to liability. In
this situation, and in many others similar to it, the state action occurs at the
institutional level rather than at the individual student level. Mentavlos'
interpretation of § 1983 would nevertheless reach this purely private conduct, even
though such conduct has no connection with the state. Such a reading of § 1983 is
plainly contrary to the statute's language and to its policy and purpose.'
C. Both the Fourth Circuit andMentavlos Overlooked a Section 1983 Theory
That Could Have Allowed Mentavlos To Avoid Summary Judgment
Although § 1983 is not intended to reach "'merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful,""'0. 2 an exception arises when private actors act
jointly, or in concert, with a person recognized as a state actor for § 1983
purposes. 03 The United States Supreme Court has held that
to act "under color of' state law for § 1983 purposes does not
require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough
that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the
challenged action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of
§ 1983 actions.'04
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that "'private persons who willfully
participate injoint action with a state official act under color of state law within the
98. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 318.
99. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
100. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,298 (2001).
101. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1999).
102. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 310 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50
(1999)).
103. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27-28 (1980).
104. Id.
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meaning of § 1983. ' ' '"°" Thus, federal courts have recognized a theory that could
subject Cadets Anderson and Saleeby to liability under § 1983 for their alleged
sexual abuse and harassment of Mentavlos, even though the cadets were not
themselves considered state actors.
If Mentavlos had pleaded and argued a "conspiracy" or 'joint-action" claim
under § 1983, she probably could have avoided summary judgment at the district
court level. The Fourth Circuit has followed the holding that "'[t]o prove a
conspiracy between the state and private parties under Section 1983, the [plaintiffs]
must show 'an agreement or 'meeting of the minds' to violate constitutional
rights.)"" 0 6 Summary judgment is proper when there exists "no genuine issue as to
any material fact' and when the "moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."' 7 The district court granted the cadets' motions for summary judgment
because Mentavlos' arguments failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the cadets were state actors.108 Mentavlos might have avoided summary
judgment by creating an issue of fact as to whether the private cadets conspired or
actedjointly with state actors and administrators to deprive her of her constitutional
rights. To support this conspiracy or joint action assertion, Mentavlos would have
had to argue and produce the following evidence: (1) Citadel administrators and
her commanding officer were state actors for purposes of § 1983, and (2) they acted
jointly with the cadets, including Anderson and Saleeby, to create a hostile and
abusive environment for her. 9
First, Mentavlos would have had to argue and prove that The Citadel, its
administrators, and the company commander were state actors for § 1983
purposes. "0 Mentavlos inadvertently raised an issue of fact regarding The Citadel's
status as a state actor in her discussion of Anderson and Saleeby's status. She
claimed that the cadets were state actors because "The Citadel [is] a state-supported
105. SeeJohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, No. 90-1749, 1991 WL 99073, at *2 (4th
Cir. July 15, 1991) (quoting Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1422 (4th Cir. 1983)); see
also Lord v. Riley, No. 89-1479, 1990 WL 209862, at*2 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 1991) (indicating that "[i]t
is true that an otherwise private action may come within the scope of section 1983 if it can be
established that an individual acted jointly with agents of the state in a conspiracy or 'meeting of the
minds' to deprive theplaintiffofhis orhercivil rights."); McNabb v. North Carolina, No. 1:00CV203-
T, I:00CV205-T, 2001 WL 1020041, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2001) (stating that "[a] private
[defendant] can act under color of state law if'he is a willful participant in joint action with the state
or its agents"') (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28)).
106. See John Hancock, 1991 W.L 99073, at *2 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps
Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. (1989)) (alteration in original).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Reuber v. Litton Indus., Inc., No. JH-82-910, JH-85-2028,
1986 WIL 3370, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 1986) (stating that "'[s]ummary judgment should not be
granted unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for
controversy and establishes affirnatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circumstances"' (quoting Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th
Cir. 1967))).
108. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 323.
109. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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college... and receives financial assistance and other support from the state.'
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit responded to this argument, stating that "state assistance
provided to The Citadel might be pertinent to a determination of whether The
Citadel is a state actor."' 2 The court further noted that the State of South Carolina
created The Citadel, provides assistance to the school, and pays its employees'
salaries.'1 3 Therefore, Mentavlos produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of fact as to whether The Citadel and its administrators are state actors for
§ 1983 purposes.
Nevertheless, any alleged conspiracy may not have involved Citadel
administrators. Therefore, Mentavlos would also need to show that her
commanding administrative officer, Captain Richard Ellis, was a state actor in order
to support a conspiracy claim under § 1983.' The Fourth Circuit referred to
Captain Ellis as the "army officer" assigned to Mentavlos' unit."' Since Captain
Ellis is an officer of the United States Army and was acting with supervisory
authority at a state institution, he is arguably a state actor."6 His position in the
military and his state-promulgated authority in his capacity at The Citadel create a
genuine issue as to whether he was a state actor for § 1983 purposes. Consequently,
Mentavlos could likely have survived summary judgment based on a § 1983
conspiracy claim.
Second, and most importantly, Mentavlos would need to present proof that
Cadets Anderson and Saleeby conspired or acted jointly with at least one state actor
in depriving her of her constitutional rights. 17 To meet this burden, Mentavlos
would have to show that the state actors and the private parties reached an
agreement, or a meeting of the minds, to deprive her of her federally guaranteed
111. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 318-19. The Citadel does in fact receive state support. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 59-107-10 (West Supp. 2000). Mentavlos also argued that The Citadel is "governed by
state officials whose powers are defined by statute." Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 319. However, while
some South Carolina high officials are part of The Citadel's Board of Visitors, they serve ex officio
in their capacity as board members. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-121-10 (West Supp. 2000). However,
there is clearly some state involvement in The Citadel's operation as Mentavlos asserted.
112. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 319.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
115. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306. At the time of the Mentavlos incidents, Captain Ellis was in
fact an active duty commissioned officer in the United States Army; he was assigned through the
Army ROTC program at The Citadel as the officer in charge of Mentavlos' unit and its barracks where
much of the alleged harassment occurred. See Sybil Fix, Mentavlos Tells Story, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 15, 1997, at Al.
116. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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rights."' Satisfying this burden may prove difficult," 9 but to avoid summary
judgment Mentavlos would need only to create an issue of fact about whether the
administrators and the cadets reached an agreement to deprive her of her
constitutional rights.'2
Mentavlos must initially create a factual issue as to whether Cadets Anderson
and Saleeby reached some type of agreement with administrators or with their
commanding officer.' In her brief to the Fourth Circuit, Mentavlos alleged various
facts that could create such an issue. She asserted that The Citadel's unfriendly
response to Shannon Faulkner's admission and its subsequent jubilation in her
withdrawal evidenced an internal desire to create an environment hostile to female
cadets." She also claimed that Citadel administrators openly resisted changes in
the school's tradition of "zealously oppos[ing] the introduction of females into the
student population" by failing to make appropriate procedural changes to encourage
gender integration."
However, the assertions Mentavlos made concerning the history of the
company into which she was placed upon her arrival at The Citadel are most
significant for conspiracy purposes. Mentavlos claimed that the administration
consciously placed her into Echo Company, a cadet company allegedly "known for
its strict military methodology, low grades, and harshness on knobs."'24 If Citadel
administrators truly had a tacit desire to treat women as harshly as possible to
ensure that they would withdraw from the school, then Mentavlos could argue that
118. See McNabb v. North Carolina, No. I:00CV203-T, 1:00CV205-T, 2001 WL 1020041, at
*3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2001); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, No. 90-1749,
1991 WL 99073, at *2 (4th Cir. July 15, 1991) (noting that private parties must willfully participate
with a state actor).
119. See Lord v. Riley, No. 89-1479, 1990 WL 209862, at *2 (holding that since the plaintiff
did not produce any evidence of an agreement between a police officer and a firefighter, she failed
to show a conspiracy under § 1983 for improper arrest); see also John Hancock, 1991 WL 99073, at
*2 (holding that where evidence showed the defendant merely acquiesced in a police investigation,
the plaintiff failed to prove a conspiracy under § 1983, but see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29
(1980) (holding that"[p]rivate parties who corruptly conspirewith ajudge in connection with [bribery
concerning thatjudge] are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983").
120. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. See Friedman, supra note 63, at427-67 (containing Mentavlos' appellate brief to the Fourth
Circuit, submitted by Leon Friedman, who served as one of Mentavlos' counsel). The briefs
"Statement of Facts" details incidents surrounding the hostile welcome Shannon Faulkner received
at The Citadel. Id. at 433. Mentavlos asserts that the administration did little or nothing to accept or
to protect Faulkner, and that upon her departure from The Citadel, cadets "danced and rejoiced in the
rain." Id. Mentavlos even compared The Citadel's response to female cadets being admitted to "the
welcome which [the first black student] received when he enrolled at the University of Mississippi
Law School in 1962." Id.
123. Id. at 435.
124. Id. at 437. Mentavlos also alleged that Echo Company was nicknamed "the Stalag." Id.
Furthermore, Mentavlos' "Statement of Facts" claims that Echo Company had an open obsession with
Nazism and Adolf Hitler, which was evidenced by members, "openly display[ing] swastikas in one
form or another, and etch[ing] double lightning-bolts, representing Hitler's elite 'SS' troops during
WWII, on the outside of their hats." Id.
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the administrators deliberately ignored Echo Company's allegedly blemished
history and placed her in a unit in which she would be harassed and pressured to
quit. Whether this argument and the facts on which it is premised are credible
would be an issue for the jury to decide.
To survive summary judgment, Mentavlos would still have to show some
agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds between either the
administrators or the commanding officer and the cadets of Echo Company."
Evidence to demonstrate such an agreement or understanding may exist due to the
lenient punishment of one of the cadets involved in the alleged harassment. Citadel
administrators reduced the punishment levied against one male cadet involved to
the minimal level possible. 26 Such treatment, Mentavlos could argue, indicates an
understanding between cadets and officials that allegedly abusive behavior will not
only be tolerated by the school, but will also be tacitly condoned.'2
However, the cadets would probably counterargue that their actions did not
reflect any conspiracy or agreement and that they were simply acting under, and in
accordance with, the rigorous disciplinary system that has been in place at the
school for over one hundred years. '28 Furthermore, the cadets would likely point to
procedures such as the grievance system and sensitivity training as evidence that
both The Citadel and its cadets were attempting to strike a balance between gender
integration and the proud traditions of the institution.2 9
Nevertheless, given her factual allegations as stated above and as outlined in
her brief to the Fourth Circuit, Mentavlos could probably establish a genuine factual
issue concerning an agreement or understanding between school leaders and cadets.
She could likely illustrate The Citadel's steadfast opposition to admitting women,
manifested by its cadets' jubilant celebration when the first woman to join the
Corps of Cadets withdrew.'30 The cadets' andthe administration's sense oftradition
and their open opposition to gender integration engendered an atmosphere of
hostility towards Mentavlos and other women. Mentavlos could then argue that
officials understood that by placing her in Echo Company, she would be subjected
to harsh treatment and would likely withdraw.'
Similarly, Mentavlos could assert that Echo Company cadets and commanders
understood that the administration's decision to place her in their company meant
that they were to treat her harshly enough to ensure her withdrawal. Mentavlos
would definitely need more evidence to prove the agreement element of a
conspiracy action under § 1983, but these facts and allegations would probably
suffice to avoid summary judgment.
32
125. See supra note 103-05 and accompanying text.
126. Freidman, supra note 63, at 440.
127. However, The Citadel did take some decisive disciplinary actions, including leveling two
suspensions. Id. at 440 n.7.
128. See ORIGINS, supra note 13.
129. See THE FouRTH CLASS SYSTEM MANUAL, supra note 15, at 7-10.
130. See supra note 122.
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 108-07 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Mentavlos must prove that an actual deprivation of her constitutional
rights occurred at the hands of private actors who conspired with state actors. 133 For
her claim to survive summary judgment, Mentavlos needs to show a factual issue
as to whether the cadets' actions constituted impermissible sexual harassment and
gender discrimination. '4 This maybe the toughest element for Mentavlos to satisfy.
The cadets would likely argue that the alleged abuse Mentavlos suffered was
not due to her gender, but that she was subjected to the rigorous discipline imposed
on every fourth class member regardless of gender. 31 Indeed, this argument may
have merit because some of the incidents that Mentavlos described apparently did
not single out female knobs. For example, two male cadets were allegedly victims
of the "nail-polish remover" fire incident.'36 However, other incidents were
arguably motivated by gender, and these incidents may suffice to create an issue of
fact as to an actual deprivation of constitutional rights. Mentavlos could argue that
the posting of a manufactured pornographic picture of her on the Internet was
motivated by her gender. 37 Additionally, both Anderson and Saleeby may have
physically touched and injured Mentavlos, 38 and there is no evidence suggesting
that males suffered this same type of treatment. Mentavlos also allegedly received
unequal treatment from Anderson regarding alcohol infractions."'
Consequently, there exists some evidence to suggest that a gender-based
motivation underlay some of the cadets' actions."4 These assertions would appear
to be sufficiently contested such that a factual issue of whether gender-based
harassment occurred would arise, and summary judgment would be improper.'4'
Unfortunately, Mentavlos' complaint missed the state-action text that likely would
have allowed her to avoid summary judgment.
133. See McNabb v. North Carolina, No. 1:00CV203-T, 1:00CV205-T, 2001 WL 1020041, at
*3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2001); see also Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.
1980) (holding that it must be found that there was not only an agreement but also an "actual
deprivation of a right secured by the constitution and laws" to make a conspiracy theory actionable).
134. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301,306 (4th Cir. 2001).
135. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
136. Hewitt & Sider, supra note 6, at 42.
137. See Friedman, supra note 63, at 438 (alleging that the Citadel administration knew about
the picture); see also Hewitt & Sider, supra note 6, at 42 (indicating that male cadets also waved sex
toys at Mentavlos and forced her to sing vulgar songs).
138. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 309.
139. Id.
140. Regardless of this evidence, proving that Cadet Saleeby engaged in gender-based
harassment and abuse could havebeen amajorproblem for Mentavlos. The district court alternatively
granted summary judgment for Saleeby on the ground that Mentavlos did not prove that his actions
were discriminatory in nature. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 628 (D.S.C. 2000).
Nevertheless, because the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant ofsummaryjudgment forboth
defendants on the ground that neither was a state actor for § 1983 purposes, it did not consider this
alternative ground. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 323 n.8. Thus, Mentavlos might have been forced to
proceed solely against Anderson.
141. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Mentavlos, 42 future actions
under § 1983 that involve students should not incorporate traditional state-action
tests to prove that the students were state actors. Since students are generally private
individuals, the traditional state-action tests will rarely convince courts that they
acted "under of color of state law" for purposes of§ 1983.43 Mentavlos argued that
The Citadel cadets were state actors based on the "powers traditionally reserved to
the State" and the "actions fairly attributable to the State" state-action tests.144 Both
the district court's granting and the Fourth Circuit's reaffirming of summary
judgment in the cadets' favor demonstrate that courts are disinclined to reach
students' private actions under § 1983, even though the students' actions may
deprive another student of constitutionally and federally guaranteed rights.
Consequently, future actions involving an alleged deprivation of a person's
constitutional rights should not rely on the general, traditional tests used to
determine who is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.
Instead, parties who wish to assert a § 1983 claim for deprivation of their
constitutional rights at the hands of private students in publicly funded educational
settings should look to alternative theories to avoid summary judgment. One such
theory is the conspiracy or joint action claim under § 1983.' 45 By showing that
private actors conspired with state actors to deprive a person of constitutionally
guaranteed rights, plaintiffs in such cases can circumvent the usual rule that § 1983
does not reach private action. Nevertheless, plaintiffs using this theory will still face
the daunting task of demonstrating an agreement between the private and state
actors as well as an actual deprivation of federal rights.'" Due to the secret nature
of conspiracies, proving an actual agreement and a deprivation of rights may be
difficult. Indeed, Mentavlos may not be have been able to prove at a trial that
142. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 323.
143. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241,254-55 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that student
editors' decisions on advertising, even with faculty advice, did not constitute state action); see also
Indorato v. Patton, 994 F. Supp. 300, 307-08 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that a scholarship football
player who struck a referee was not a state actor even though the institution paid for many of the
player's necessities and subjected the player to its own disciplinary rules).
144. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314-23.
145. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
146. See McNabb v. North Carolina, No. f:00CV203-T, I:00CV205-T, 2001 WL 1020041, at
*3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2001). Different levels of "agreements" have been held sufficient to establish
that element of the conspiracy theory under § 1983. For example, each conspirator need not know the
details of the conspiracy, but there must be a common objective between them. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, an
implied agreement where the conspirators' actions evidence a concerted effort in furtherance of a
common objective to deny a person of federal rights would apparently be sufficient to demonstrate
a conspiracy. Id. Nevertheless, to prove any conspiracy allegation, whether based on an express or
implied agreement, the plaintiff must demonstrate a meeting of the minds between the conspirators.
McNabb, 2001 WL 1020041, at *3. This meeting-of-the-minds requirement would probably be
satisfied by evidence of a common objective and of acts taken in furtherance of that objective by the
conspirators. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1541.
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Cadets Anderson and Saleeby conspired with Citadel officials to deprive her of her
federal rights, but at least she would have had the opportunity.
This Note in no way argues that Mentavlos is entitled to judgment in her favor
on the conspiracy claim; rather, it simply suggests that based on the facts and
allegations surrounding the case, Mentavlos probably could have survived summary
judgment by pleading and arguing a conspiracy under § 1983 rather than by arguing
that the private cadets were themselves state actors. In this respect, the conspiracy
claim would become a catalyst to allow Jeannie Mentavlos and other similarly
situated plaintiffs the opportunity to present their claims to a jury.
John P. Fougerousse
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